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CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE UNDER THE ADEA: AN
ARGUMENT FOR THE INTENT STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended
(ADEA),1 prohibits employers2 from discriminating on the basis of age
against individuals forty years of age or older.' An employer may not
discharge4 an employee within the protected group based on his age,5
except as provided by law. 6 In addition, the ADEA recognizes the doc-
trine of constructive discharge,7 which occurs when the employer creates
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), as
amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-
592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986).
2. The ADEA covers employers of twenty or more employees in industries affecting
commerce, including employer agents, states, political subdivisions and their agencies or
instrumentalities. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
§ 11(b), 81 Stat. 602, 605 (1967), as amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 28(a)(1), (2), 88 Stat. 55, 74 (1974) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986). As first
enacted, the ADEA prohibited discrimination against individuals at least 40 years of age
but less than 65 years of age. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L
No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)). In its statement of findings and purpose, Congress expressed concern
about the job security, unemployment and morale problems that are prominent among
older workers. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(a)(1), 81 Stat. 602, 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
621(a)(1) (1982)). In 1978, the upper age limit was raised from age 65 to age 70. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92
Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). In 1986, the
upper age limit was eliminated entirely. Age Discrimination in Employment Amend-
ments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986).
4. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
6. The ADEA recognizes a number of exceptions to its nondiscrimination provi-
sions. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342,
3342 (1986). For instance, states, political subdivisions of states, and their agencies or
instrumentalities may retire firefighters or law enforcement officers who have reached
retirement age under state or local law. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amend-
ments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 3(a)(i)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986) (amending 29
U.S.C. § 623). The ADEA also permits the involuntary retirement of employees who, for
two years prior to retirement, are in bona fide executive or high policy making positions
and are entitled to an annual pension, or similar retirement benefits, of at least $44,000
from the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Finally, the ADEA contains
an affirmative defense that allows the employer to discharge an individual based upon age
"where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
7. See, eg., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1986); Cal-
houn v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 56-63 (1st Cir. 1986); Williams v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 49-50 (6th Cir. 1985).
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compelled to resign.8
There is a split of authority concerning the elements that an ADEA
plaintiff must prove in order to establish constructive discharge.9 A ma-
jority of courts require the plaintiff to prove only that the employer delib-
erately created working conditions that were so intolerable that a
reasonable employee would be compelled to resign.10 This is known as
8. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (quot-
ing Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1028 (1985)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d
322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d
140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.
1981) (quoting Slotkin v. Human Dev. Corp., 454 F. Supp. 250, 255 (E.D. Mo. 1978)).
9. See infra notes 49-79 and accompanying text. This split in authority has been
recognized in Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 & n.3
(N.D. Ill. 1984). The similarities between the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1982)), in the constructive discharge context allows for parallel analysis of con-
structive discharge cases brought under each statute. See infra notes 35-46 and accompa-
nying text. Courts have recognized the split in authority in Title VII cases as well. See
Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys.,
747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 & n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). The controversy also has been recognized by several commentators, See B.
Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 611-12 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinaf-
ter Schlei & Grossman] and 1983-84 Cumulative Supplement 127-28 (1985) [hereinafter
Schlei & Grossman Supplement]; Baxter and Farrell, Constructive Discharge-When
Quitting Means Getting Fired, 7 Employee Rel. L. J. 346, 349-52 (1981-82); Casey, Con-
structive Discharge Under Title VII in Institutions of Higher Education, 9 J. C. & U. L.
191, 193 (1982-83); Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII
Litigation, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 587-88 (1986) [hereinafter Choosing a Standard];
Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the ADFA, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
561, 562 (1986) [hereinafter Constructive Discharge]; Case Note, LABOR LAW-Employ-
ment Discrimination-Employer that Knowingly Permits Acts of Discrimination So Intol-
erable that Reasonable Employee Subject to Them Would Resign May Be Liable for
Constructive Discharge Under Title VII, Goss v. Exxon Office Systems (1984), 30 Vill. L.
Rev. 1028, 1030-31 (1985) [hereinafter Liability for Constructive Discharge].
10. Courts that currently follow this standard include the Courts of Appeals for the
First Circuit, see Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986),
the Second Circuit, see Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985); Pena
v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit, see Goss v.
Exxon Office Sys., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit, see Downey v.
Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981); Bourque v.
Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit, see Satterwhite v. Smith, 744
F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1982),
the Tenth Circuit, see Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986), the
Eleventh Circuit, see Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 786 F.2d 1537, 1542 n.4 (11th Cir.
1986); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) and the
D.C. Circuit, see Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission also uses this standard. See EEOC Dec. No. 86-6, 40 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1890, 1892 (1986); EEOC Dec. No. 84-1, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1887, 1891-92 (1983); see also Schlei & Grossman Supplement, supra note 9, at
128 (noting that the EEOC uses the objective standard).
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the "reasonable person"" standard, or the "objective" 12 standard. A mi-
nority of courts require the plaintiff to prove both intolerable working
conditions and the employer's intent to compel the employee's resigna-
tion. 3 This is known as the "employer intent" standard."
Part I of this Note describes the two standards, with particular empha-
sis on ADEA cases. Part II presents arguments in favor of the employer
intent standard based on general principles of employment discrimina-
tion law from both the ADEA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
(Title VII). Part III argues that the employer intent standard is particu-
larly appropriate in constructive discharge cases brought under the
ADEA.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ADEA AND THE Two STANDARDS FOR
ESTABLISHING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
A. Constructive Discharge in General
Section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA prohibits employers from unlawfully
discharging workers because of their age.' 5 The plaintiff in an ADEA
discharge case must prove that he was discharged because of his age.' 6
Similarly, constructive discharges based on age are prohibited by section
11. See Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (N.D. I11.
1984).
12. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986). Although these
terms are used interchangeably, for purposes of this Note the term "objective standard"
will be used.
13. Courts that currently follow this standard are the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, see Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Holsey v Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633,
672 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank,
467 U.S. 867 (1984), the Sixth Circuit, see Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 522-23 (6th
Cir. 1984) and the Eighth Circuit, see Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217
(8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. CL 1285 (1986); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646
F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981); Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220,
223 (8th Cir. 1977).
Based on its holding in Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982), there is
some question concerning the standard used by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 67.
14. See, e.g., Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at 566-67.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) (1982).
16. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1549 (1 1th Cir.
1984); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1983); Rizzo v. Means
Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1127 (N.D. 111. 1986) (quoting La Montagne v. American
Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1984)); Real v. Continental Group,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434, 439-40 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see also Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981); Cebula v. General Elec. Co., 614 F. Supp. 260, 265
(N.D. Ill. 1985); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 454 F. Supp. 78, 81 (N.D. Ill.
1978). "An ADEA plaintiff is not required to show that age was the sole motivating
factor in the employment decision, but only that age was also a reason, and that age was
the factor that made a difference." Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 179
(10th Cir. 1986).
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623(a)(1)."7 Constructive discharges must be distinguished from actual
discharges. An actual discharge occurs when the employer directly ter-
minates the employment relationship."8 A constructive discharge results
"when the employer, rather than acting directly, 'deliberately makes an
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
into an involuntary resignation.' ,19 To be treated as a constructive dis-
charge, the employee actually must have resigned.2" Further, the plain-
tiff must establish underlying discrimination, that is, an unlawful basis
for the constructive discharge,2" such as age discrimination.22 The fail-
ure to establish unlawful discrimination is fatal to a constructive dis-
charge claim. 3
17. See Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 177-78 (10th Cir. 1986); Henn
v. National Geographic Soc'y, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1186, 1186-87 (N.D. I11.
1986), aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987); Rotert v. Jefferson
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 623 F. Supp. 1114, 1117-18 (D. Conn. 1985).
18. "An actual discharge occurs when an employer fires, dismisses, releases, ousts,
lets go, terminates, sacks, gets rid of, gives the gate to, cans, axes, bounces, or gives
walking papers to an employee resulting in the severance of the entire employment rela-
tionship." Frazer v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 491 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (M.D. Ga.
1980), aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1981).
19. Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Young v.
Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)).
20. See Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.)
("These facts do not fit the normal constructive discharge case because [plaintiff] never
resigned; he was fired."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.) (court rejects constructive discharge claim
because plaintiff did not resign), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Our
conclusion that [plaintiff] was not subject to sex discrimination.., effectively determines
the outcome of her claim of constructive discharge."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285
(1986); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1984) (Plaintiff "has
not established the underlying illegality necessary to support a constructive discharge
claim."); Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327-28 (S.D. Miss. 1986)
(constructive discharge established, but complaint dismissed because Title VII violation
not established).
If the plaintiff prevails on the underlying discrimination claim, he is entitled to a rem-
edy for that discrimination, regardless of the court's determination on the constructive
discharge claim. See Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 206-08 (5th Cir. 1986) (har-
assment, criticism, repeated inquiries concerning retirement); Calhoun v. Acme Cleve-
land Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1986) (repeated inquiries concerning retirement,
demotion, threat of onerous work schedule); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770
F.2d 47, 50 (6th Cir. 1985) (demotion to a job plaintiff was not physically capable of
performing).
23. See supra note 21.
The following two ADEA cases illustrate typical constructive discharge situations. In
Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1986), the court found
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of constructive discharge. See id. at 443.
The plaintiff was demoted after being passed over for promotion. See id. Thereafter, the
employer, which had been undergoing consolidation, see id. at 438, denied the plaintiff's
requests for other promotions and relocation benefits. See id. at 443. When the plaintiff
was offered another demotion, he resigned. See id. at 439. It was clear by the time of
plaintiff's resignation that he could not maintain his previous status with the company,
[Vol. 55
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A court's determination of constructive discharge is significant for sev-
eral reasons. At trial, in cases using the tripartite order of proof24 under
which the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case" of a Title VII26
or ADEA violation, 27 constructive discharge is an element of the plain-
and that he had lost all hope of career advancement. See id at 443. Finding that the
employer subjected the plaintiff to a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment over
a period of time, the court held that the plaintiff was justified in resigning. See id. at 443-
44.
Alternatively, in Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment for the plaintiff on his constructive discharge claim. See id. at
1252. The employer assigned the plaintiff to manage what the plaintiff considered a diffi-
cult district with unique problems. See id at 1253. The employer criticized the plaintiff
for his financial irresponsibility. See id The plaintiff retired following a financial dispute
with his supervisor, see id. at 1254, and failed in his efforts to rescind his resignation. See
id The court held that these facts failed to establish constructive discharge. See id. at
1255-56.
24. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court
established a three stage order of proof to be used in disparate treatment cases brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)). See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802-04. In stage one, "Itihe complainant... must carry the initial burden... of
establishing a prima facie case of... discrimination." Id at 802. In stage two, "[t]he
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the... [action]." Id In stage three, the complainant must "be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [employer's] stated reason.. . was in fact pretext." Id. at 804.
In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme
Court confirmed that the burden that shifts to the employer in the second stage is a
burden of production, not a burden of persuasion. See id at 254-55; infra notes 104-11
and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of disparate treatment.
25. In ADEA discharge cases, the prima facie case typically consists of the following
elements: "(1) membership in the protected class; (2) qualification for the position; (3) re-
placement by a younger worker; and (4) discharge." Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
770 F.2d 47, 49 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 786 F.2d 1537,
1542 (11th Cir. 1986); Spear v. Dayton's, 771 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (8th Cir. 1985).
"Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. Once
a prima facie case has been established, judgment should be entered for the plaintiff un-
less the employer overcomes the presumption. See id. Of course, establishment of a
prima facie case is not a guarantee that the plaintiff will prevail. See Christensen v. Equi-
table Life Assurance Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff established prima
facie case that was then successfully rebutted), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 885 (1986).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Both McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), see
supra note 24, were Title VII cases. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that, in a
race discrimination hiring case, the complainant may establish a prima facie case
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted).
27. The establishment of a presumption of discrimination through use of the prima
facie case has been recognized in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus.,
786 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 1986); Spear v. Dayton's, 771 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (8th
Cir. 1985); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 49 (6th Cir. 1985). The
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tiff's prima facie case.28 A determination of constructive discharge enti-
tles the plaintiff to the same remedies as if he were discharged.29 When
adjudicating claims of constructive discharge, the court may consider ev-
idence of events that otherwise are time-barred in their own right,30 such
prima facie case required in ADEA cases is similar to that required in comparable Title
VII cases. In both instances, the plaintiff is required to establish that he is a member of
the statute's protected class. See, e.g., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 206-07
(5th Cir. 1986); Lewis, 786 F.2d at 1542; Spear, 771 F.2d at 1142-43; Williams, 770 F.2d
at 49.
Courts are flexible in applying variations of the prima facie case set out in McDonnell
Douglas. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1093-94 (5th Cir. Unit B
Oct. 1981); McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 752-54 (5th Cir. 1980);
Kneisley v. Hercules Inc., 577 F. Supp. 726, 730-31 (D. Del. 1983).
28. See, e.g., Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 786 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 1986);
Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 49 (6th Cir. 1985); Christensen v. Equi-
table Life Assurance Soc'y, 767 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 885
(1986).
Although sometimes discussed by courts merely as an element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case, constructive discharge is often considered as a separate liability issue accompa-
nying other discrimination claims. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251,
1252, 1254 (4th Cir. 1985) (constructive discharge claim accompanying claim of unlawful
denial of promotion), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762
F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985) (constructive discharge claim accompanying harassment
claim); Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B June
1981) (constructive discharge claim accompanying claim of unlawful demotion, denial of
transfer request).
29. See, e.g., Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977);
Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975). Examples
of these remedies include back pay for the post-resignation period, see Satterwhite v.
Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509
F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975), reinstatement, see Derr v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342 (10th Cir. 1986), and front pay in lieu of reinstatement,
see Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., 747 F.2d 885, 888-90 (3d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of
front pay under the ADEA, see Note, Front Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstate-
ment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1984)
[hereinafter Front Pay Under ADEA].
30. The ADEA statute of limitations period is generally two years. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(e) (1982), incorporating the statute of limitations period of the Portal to Portal Act
of 1947, ch. 52, § 6, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, 255
(1982)). Under this statute, if a violation of the ADEA is "willful," the statute of limita-
tions period is three years. See id.; see also infra notes 199-232 and accompanying text
for a discussion of willfulness under the ADEA.
Under the ADEA, the complainant must file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful practice. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d)(l) (1982). The ADEA provides that when an alleged violation occurs in a state
that has an agency empowered to grant or seek relief from such alleged violation, an
individual may not bring suit to address the ADEA violation until 60 days after com-
mencement of the proceedings, unless the state proceedings were terminated earlier. 29
U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982). In states that have such such an agency, the filing period may be
extended to 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory practice, or within 30 days of
notice of termination of state proceedings, whichever is earlier. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2)
(1982). "Most courts have held that the 180/300-day filing requirement is akin to a
statute of limitations, which can be tolled for equitable reasons." Schlei & Grossman,
supra note 9, at 490.
In ADEA constructive discharge cases, courts have considered evidence of events that
were time-barred in their own right. See Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d
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as the employer's demotion of the employee3 or denial of the employee's
transfer request.32 The constructive discharge doctrine also is significant
in non-trial contexts, such as when victims of discrimination resign and
then seek unemployment insurance benefits.33 The doctrine also may be
relevant to employees' entitlement to company benefits, such as sever-
ance pay.
34
B. The Connection between the ADEA and Title VII in Constructive
Discharge Cases
The doctrine of constructive discharge has proved to be a useful device
in labor law. It originated in cases brought under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)35 and subsequently was expanded and applied in
employment discrimination cases under Title VII. 36 Later, the doctrine
was applied in ADEA cases, with little modification from its application
under Title VII.
37
Although Title VII and the ADEA cannot be considered completely
interchangeable, there are many similarities between the two statutes.
The Supreme Court has noted that Congress essentially incorporated the
substantive prohibitions of Title VII into the ADEA.38 When an ADEA
302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (time-barred events "should be allowed as evidence
on the question of whether [plaintiff] was constructively discharged"); Allen v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (time-barred events will "be allowed
as evidence on the questions whether plaintiff was constructively discharged and whether
age was a factor"). But see Pierce v. Green Giant Co., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1683, 1686 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (time-barred acts, consistent with the 180 day rule, cannot
be considered to determine whether the plaintiff's later working conditions compelled
him to resign).
31. See Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B
June 1981); Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
32. See Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B
June 1981).
33. See Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Work-Related
Sexual Harassment, 3 Harv. Women's L.J. 173, 175-76 & 175 n.14 (1980).
34. See Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1983); Devine v. Xerox
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 603, 607-08 (D. Del. 1985); Donnelly v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 465 F.
Supp. 696, 697-98 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see, eg., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys.,
747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 454 F. Supp. 78,
81 (N.D. Ill. 1978); EEOC Dec. No. 84-1, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1887, 1891
(1983); Choosing a Standard, supra note 9, at 589; Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at
566-67; Liability for Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at 1029 n.3.
36. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). For examples of Title VII cases
applying the constructive discharge doctrine, see Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber
Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); Muller v.
United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. See, e.g., Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983); Downey
v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981); Houghton
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966
(1977). For a discussion of the similarity of treatment of constructive discharge under
the two statutes, see infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
38. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The Supreme Court has noted
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provision is traced to a complementary section of Title VII, the intent of
Congress is that the two provisions be construed consistently. 39 Exam-
ples of situations in which Title VII and the ADEA are construed con-
sistently include the burden and order of proof,4 ° equitable tolling of
statutes of limitations,41 Rule 56 summary judgment analysis, 42 com-
mencement of appropriate state proceedings as a prerequisite to suit in
federal court43 and the naming of the proper defendant".
The many similarities between Title VII and the ADEA allow for par-
allel analysis of constructive discharge cases brought under each stat-
ute.45 Indeed, courts consistently rely on interpretations of one statute to
that the elimination of workplace discrimination is the common purpose of both statutes.
See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
39. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Romain v. Shear, 799
F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 2183 (1987).
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. "The standards relating to burden and
order of proof in Title VII cases apply as well to cases arising under the ADEA." Pena v.
Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the Title VII filing requirement is a
statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling, waiver and estoppel. See id. at 393.
Schlei & Grossman have noted that "there is little doubt but that the Age Act will be
uniformly interpreted in a similar manner. The tendency of courts in ADEA cases to
look to Title VII precedent to determine which equitable considerations will extend the
filing period will undoubtedly continue." Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 491.
42. See Rizzo v. Means Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1127 (N.D. II1. 1986). The
court noted that "the first step in [considering a motion for summary judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56] is to establish the 'essential element(s)' of plaintiffs' case," id., and
found that although "the nature of the animus in ADEA and Title VII/Section 1983
cases differs, the essential element is the same." Id.
43. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 756 (1979). The Court noted that:
Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace, since the language of [ADEA] § 14(b) is al-
most in haec verba with [Title VII] § 706(c), and since the legislative history of
§ 14(b) indicates that its source was § 706(c), we may properly conclude that
Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of
§ 706(c).
Id.
44. See Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2183 (1987); Ellis v. United States Postal Serv., 784 F.2d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 1986); Gillis-
pie v. Helms, 559 F. Supp. 40, 41-42 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
45. A treatise writer has advanced guidelines for determining whether Title VII au-
thority may be applied by analogy to ADEA cases. Noting that there are similarities and
differences in the language of Title VII and the ADEA, he states that "the significance of
the differences in language, if any, and the significance of the different characteristics of
age and racial discrimination must be considered with respect to the particular issue at
hand." 1 H. Eglit, Age Discrimination, § 16.02, at 16-7 (1985) [hereinafter Eglit].
For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently supplemented
its compliance manual with a policy directive stating that "an employer has a duty under
the ADEA to maintain a work environment free from age harassment." EEOC Directive
on Age Harassment, § 615.11(a), as reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 41, at A-I
(Mar. 4, 1987) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter EEOC Directive]. In its directive, the
EEOC equates harassment based on age, unlawful under the ADEA, to harassment un-
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support similar interpretations of the other.46 Thus, given analogous
treatment of constructive discharge under the two statutes, this Note re-
fers to cases construing both Title VII and the ADEA.4 '
lawful under Title VII, such as sexual harassment, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986), har-
assment based on national origin, see 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (1986) (EEOC Regulations
concerning harassment based on national origin), race, color and religion, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) at n.1 ("principles involved [in the sexual harassment guidelines] continue to
apply to race, color, religion or national origin"). EEOC Directive § 615.11(a) at A-1.
The EEOC states that an employer's duty under the ADEA to maintain a harassment-
free work environment is similar to that imposed under Title VII. See id. Principles
developed in Title VII cases may be borrowed and applied to the handling of age harass-
ment cases. See id. Further, the EEOC recognizes the connection between age harass-
ment and constructive discharge, noting that victims of age discrimination may resign
and allege constructive discharge. See id at § 615.1 l(b) and examples 4 & 5 at A-I to A-
2.
Of course, unique provisions exist in each statute. Part III of this Note establishes that
a number of unique ADEA provisions and situations provide additional support for use
of the employer intent standard in ADEA cases.
46. In adjudicating ADEA constructive discharge cases, courts consistently cite con-
structive discharge cases brought under Title VII. See, eg., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co.,
803 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 65
(5th Cir. 1980)); Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 177 (10th Cir. 1986)
(citing Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975)); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983), res'd on other grounds
sub nom Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1461 (1986); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Bour-
que v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980) and Young v. Southwestern Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Conversely, courts adjudicating Title VII constructive discharge cases consistently cite
constructive discharge cases brought under the ADEA. See, e.g., Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251,
1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986)); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762
F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d
Cir. 1983)); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., 747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Pena v.
Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983)); Smith v. Acme Spinning Co., 40
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104, 1109 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (citing Bristow v. Daily Press,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986)).
47. Although most employment discrimination constructive discharge cases are
brought under the ADEA or Title VII, such claims also are actionable under § 16 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, R.S. § 1977, derived from Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 144, 16
Stat. 140, 144 (1871) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)), see, e.g., Martin v. Citibank,
N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984); Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982), the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, RS. § 1979, derived from Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13,
13 (1871) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)), see, eg., Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d
1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984);
Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469
U.S. 1145 (1985), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, Title I, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 829, 891 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 at § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), see, eg., Crouch v. Mo-Kan
Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d 805, 810 (10th Cir. 1984); Devine v. Xerox Corp.,
625 F. Supp. 603, 607-08 (D. Del. 1985) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, § 15(a)(3)
(codified as 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982)), see, e.g., Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841 (9th
Cir. 1986).
This Note does not consider the status of the constructive discharge doctrine under
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C. The Two Standards for Establishing Constructive Discharge
Although it is well recognized that constructive discharge is actionable
under the ADEA, Title VII and other employment discrimination stat-
utes, some disagreement exists regarding the elements required to estab-
lish the plaintiff's case.48 Two lines of authority have developed: the
objective standard and the employer intent standard.
1. The Objective Standard
A majority of courts apply the objective standard,49 which subjects the
employer to liability for constructive discharge when it deliberately
makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee
is forced to resign.5 0 The standard is considered objective because the
state law wrongful discharge theories. Different state courts have accepted, see Beyc v.
Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 649-53, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201-03 (Ct. Spec.
App.), cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984), and implicitly recognized, argu-
endo, see McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 233-34, 471 N.E.2d
47, 49-50 (1984), the applicability of constructive discharge to a wrongful discharge situa-
tion. The federal statutory constructive discharge cases have been applied in state law
wrongful discharge cases. See Beye, 59 Md. App. at 651-53, 477 A.2d at 1201-03.
48. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
As noted by a supporter of the objective standard, in most cases the court's choice to
use the objective standard or the intent standard will not be determinative of the underly-
ing issue of constructive discharge. See Choosing a Standard, supra note 9, at 612. In
most cases in which working conditions are found to be objectively intolerable, the plain-
tiff will be able to establish intent to compel resignation, in part by using the same evi-
dence used to establish intolerable working conditions. See id. The use of one standard
over another will be determinative only when an employer deliberately makes working
conditions intolerable, but does not intend to compel resignation. See id. at 612-13.
Although this scenario may be possible in a Title VII situation in which the employer has
an economic interest in maintaining the employment relationship, such as one when an
employer pays a female employee less for her work than a male employee, it is less likely
in an ADEA situation, where older workers generally are higher paid than younger em-
ployees. See infra note 172. Accordingly, it is arguable that the use of one standard or
the other will make less of a difference in an ADEA case than it would in a Title VII case.
49. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit is said to have not
directly addressed the issue of constructive discharge in ADEA or Title VII cases. See
Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (N.D. I11. 1984); Bailey
v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D. Ill. 1984). A district court in the Seventh Circuit
has adopted the objective standard. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 40 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1186, 1187 (N.D. Il. 1986), aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987); Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1096,
1101 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D. Ill. 1984). An early
Seventh Circuit constructive discharge case brought under a § 1983 due process theory,
Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S.
1145 (1985), did not adopt either standard explicitly. However, the court did cite a
number of objective-standard cases. See id. at 694 (citing Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168,
1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980)).
In Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1304 (1987), a recent ADEA case, the Seventh Circuit seemed to apply an objective-
standard definition of constructive discharge. See id. at 314. However, the court used
language of intent as well. See id. at 314-15. Accordingly, the status of the Seventh
Circuit remains uncertain.
50. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984); Pena v.
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issue is whether the working conditions are intolerable from the view-
point of a reasonable person.51 The employer's intent to compel the res-
ignation is irrelevant. 2
Under the objective standard, the existence of discrimination, such as
the failure to promote5 3 or unequal pay for equal work, 4 does not by
itself support a constructive discharge finding. To prevail, the employee
must have resigned because of objectively intolerable working condi-
tions.55 A number of objective-standard courts require that the plaintiff
prove "aggravating factors" to establish that working conditions were
intolerable. 6 Aggravating factors may be proved by showing a con-
tinuous pattern of discriminatory treatment,5 7 such as deprivation of ca-
reer opportunities over several years,58 or constant subjection to racial
insults.59 Although a pattern of discrimination normally is required," a
Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr.
Co., 661 F.2d 369, 371-72 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981).
51. See, eg., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1986); Kelleher
v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985).
52. See, eg., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1986); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1986); Kelleher v. Flawn, 761
F.2d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985). Under the objective standard, the employer's role is
described most often as "'deliberately mak[ing] an employee's working conditions so
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.'" Pena v. Brat-
tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Young v. Southwestern Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762
F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Pena, 702 F.2d at 325, quoting Young, 509 F.2d at
144); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir.
Unit A May 1981) (citing Young, 509 F.2d at 144).
53. See, eg., Wardwell v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 786 F.2d 1554, 1558
(lth Cir. 1986); Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982).
54. See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982);
Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. Unit A
May 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980); Bailey v.
Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
55. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1984); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d
806, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. Unit A
May 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
For example, in Clark, the plaintiff retired, claiming constructive discharge in violation
of Title VII. See id. at 1170-71. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that "a
finding that [the plaintiff] was constructively discharged must be justified by the existence
of certain 'aggravating factors.'" Id at 1174. Citing Bourque, 617 F.2d at 66, the court
stated that a "Title VII plaintiff must, therefore, 'mitigate damages by remaining on the
job' unless that job presents 'such an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee
would be forced to resign.'" Clark, 665 F.2d at 1173. The Clark court held that the
plaintiff established sufficient aggravating factors, see id. at 1174, based on the employer's
failure to promote or laterally transfer plaintiff, and its deprivation of training opportuni-
ties from plaintiff. See id. at 1170, 1175-76.
57. See eg., Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984); Nolan v.
Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1982); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D.
Il. 1984).
58. See Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59. See Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1382 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Taylor
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constructive discharge finding may be predicated on an isolated incident
of discrimination.6'
Advocates of the objective standard claim that it simplifies the task for
the fact finder by eliminating the requirement of proving intent to compel
resignation, 62 provides a more equitable balancing of employer and em-
ployee interests and Title VII make-whole and deterrent objectives,63
places a lighter burden on the plaintiff6' and is consistent with well rec-
ognized principles of labor and employment law,65 such as mitigation of
damages.66
2. The Employer Intent Standard
A minority of the courts67 require that the plaintiff prove not only
v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1981) ("dismal" racial atmosphere warranted
district court judgment for the plaintiff on her constructive discharge claim).
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61. See Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 371-72 (5th Cir. Nov.
1981); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Bourque v.
Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66-67 (5th Cir. 1980) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (although
single violation necessarily does not support a constructive discharge finding, the facts
therein warrant such a finding).
62. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) ("We also believe
the [objective] standard will simplify the task of the finder of fact in determining not only
whether the employer discriminated against the employee but also whether the manner of
discrimination rendered work conditions intolerable."); Choosing a Standard, supra note
9, at 614 ("Under the more stringent employer intent standard, employers will sometimes
escape liability because of the difficulties that the plaintiff will encounter in proving that
the employer had the requisite intent.").
63. See Choosing a Standard, supra note 9, at 615-16 (the Title VII deterrent and
make-whole policies are better served by the objective standard); Constructive Discharge,
supra note 9, at 573-74 (the make-whole and prophylactic Title VII objectives are best
served by the objective standard).
64. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986) (objective standard
is "less stringent" than the employer intent standard); Choosing a Standard, supra note 9,
at 616 (employees have an easier task of proving constructive discharge when they do not
have to prove intent to compel resignation); see also id. at 617 (objective standard relieves
employee of the requirements of showing specific employer intent and staying on the job
in the face of intolerable, aggravated conditions); Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at
580 (The objective standard "does not place the additional and unnecessary burden on
the employee of having to prove an employer's specific intent.").
65. See Liability for Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at 1036-37.
66. See Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at 575. For a discussion of mitigation of
damages, see supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See supra note 10 for a listing of the
courts of appeals applying the majority objective standard.
Originally, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit used the intent standard. See
Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982); Coe v. Yellow
Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 454 (10th Cir. 1981); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509
F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Recently, however, the
Court of the Appeals for the Tenth Circuit announced its "unqualified adoption of [the]
objective standard." See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986).
Some commentators have categorized the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as
following the objective standard, see Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 611 & n.40;
Choosing a Standard, supra note 9, at 588 & n.10; Liability for Constructive Discharge,
supra note 9, at 1035-36, based on its holding in Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th
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intolerable working conditions,6" as required by objective-standard
courts,6 9 but also the employer's deliberate action through which it in-
tended to force the employee to resign.70 The plaintiff must often prove
the employer's intent by circumstantial evidence alone.7 A number of
intent-standard courts also have stated that an inquiry must be made into
Cir. 1982). However, the facts of that case and the language used by the court make such
a categorization less than certain.
In some ways, it appears that the court uses the objective standard. In support of its
constructive discharge definition, the Held court cited Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550
F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977), an earlier Sixth Circuit case, as
involving a test less strict than the intent-standard test used by Muller v. United States
Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Held, 684 F.2d
at 432. The Held court noted that Jacobs was consistent with the Fifth Circuit's objec-
five-standard rule. See id.
Other aspects of the Held case indicate that it used an intent standard. The Held court
cited Jacobs for the proposition that "the constructive discharge issue depends upon the
facts of each case and requires an inquiry into the intent of the employer and the reason-
ably foreseeable impact of the employer's conduct upon the employee." Id. Objective-
standard courts normally consider the employer's intent to be irrelevant. See supra note
52. The statement by the Held court noting the consistency of Jacobs to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's rule could have been limited to the objectively intolerable working conditions ele-
ment common to both standards.
The facts of the case do not clearly indicate that the employer intended to compel
resignation. The holding in Held affirmed the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff.
See Held, 684 F.2d at 433. The court found that the employer's discriminatory job as-
signment, sex-based opprobrium, plaintiff's exclusion from the supply terminal, lectures
concerning her sex life and management's use of plaintiff to run errands "formed a con-
tinuous course of discriminatory conduct which was linked to plaintiff's initial job assign-
ment and the consistent management belief that women and marketing shouldn't mix.
Thus, an environment of sexual bias was tolerated and fostered by her employer." Id. at
432. Plaintiff was assigned as a self-serve marketer, rather than to a more desireable
marketing position. Although not apparent, it is possible that the employer intended to
compel the employee's resignation, consistent with its belief that women should not work
in marketing.
68. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172
(10th Cir. 1982).
69. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. CL 1461 (1986).
70. See hi; Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1028 (1985); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984);
Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 454 (10th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bunny Bread
Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981).
71. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Intent
may be inferred through circumstantial evidence, including a failure to act in the face of
known intolerable conditions .... "), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Holsey v.
Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984) ("To act deliberately, of course, re-
quires intent. But direct evidence of intent is unnecessary. Circumstantial proof suf-
fices."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); cf Rimedio v. Revlon, Inc., 528 F. Supp.
1380, 1389 (S.D. Ohio 1982) ("Intent to discriminate can be inferred from differences in
treatment.").
The Holsey court provides an example of the proof, through circumstantial evidence, of
intent to compel resignation. It noted that "[t]he fact that higher officials knew of [the
employee's] untenable position and took no action to correct it supports the district
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"the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer's conduct upon the
employee." 72 Adding to the confusion, some objective-standard courts
also refer to reasonably foreseeable consequences to support their posi-
tions,7 3 while some intent-standard courts use the aggravated-situation
language more commonly used by objective-standard courts.74
Although the intent standard has been criticized by courts and com-
mentators as too stringent75 and, based on the requirement of determin-
ing the employer's state of mind,76 difficult to apply,77 its application is
supported by strong policy arguments. The constructive discharge doc-
trine protects an employee from a calculated effort to compel his resigna-
tion by the employer's imposition of intolerable working conditions.78
However, the employee is not guaranteed a stress-free work environment
and, by resigning, cannot use the employment discrimination laws as a
panacea to resolve work related difficulties.79
II. ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE EMPLOYER INTENT STANDARD
UNDER THE ADEA AND TITLE VII
A. Constructive Discharge Cases Brought under the NLRA
The constructive discharge doctrine originated in cases brought under
the NLRA.80 These cases applied a standard requiring the intent to
compel resignation.8 The similarities between the discrimination pro-
hibited by the NLRA and that prohibited by employment discrimination
statutes such as the ADEA mandate the use of the NLRA intent to com-
pel resignation requirement in cases brought under employment discrimi-
nation statutes.8 2
court's finding that the employment conditions were 'imposed by the company.' This
finding satisfies the requirement of deliberateness." 743 F.2d at 209.
72. Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 1984); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684
F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp.
645, 651 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (noting that "'a man is held to intend the foreseeable conse-
quences of his conduct' ") (quoting Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir.
1982)).
73. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Co., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986); Clark v. Marsh, 665
F.2d 1168, 1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
74. See Henry v. Lennox Indus., 768 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Irving v. Du-
buque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1982).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986).
79. See id.
80. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
82. There is a strong connection between the NLRA and the ADEA. Both statutes
focus on the facilitation of employer-employee relationships and industrial peace. Com-
pare Kneisley v. Hercules Inc., 577 F. Supp. 726, 734 (D. Del. 1983) (NLRA) with 29
U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982) (ADEA); Macellaro v. Goldman, 643 F.2d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)). But see Kneisley, 577 F. Supp. at 734 (ADEA does
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Under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, it is "an unfair labor practice for
not focus on employer-employee relations). In addition, both statutes focus on the rights
of the individual. Compare § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (the
section of direct relevance to constructive discharge cases) with Kneisley, 577 F. Supp. at
734 (ADEA). The concept of constructive retirement is recognized under both statutes.
Compare King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14, 18 (10th Cir. 1968) (NLRA) with
Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1981) (ADEA); Henn
v. National Geographic Soe'y, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1186, 1187-88 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987) (ADEA); Kneisley v.
Hercules Inc., 577 F. Supp. 726, 729, 738 (D. Del. 1983) (ADEA); EEOC v. Liggett &
Meyers, Inc., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1611, 1642-44 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (ADEA);
Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ADEA).
Although the statutory schemes of the NLRA and the ADEA may differ, see Kneisley,
577 F. Supp. at 734, the discrimination each statute attempts to prohibit is similar. A
review of fact situations in constructive discharge cases brought under each statute
reveals great similarities. For instance, constructive discharge cases involving allegations
of discriminatory job assignment have arisen under both the NLRA, see NLRB v. S.E.
Nichols of Ohio, Inc., 704 F.2d 921, 922 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
914 (1983); Kaynard v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir. 1980), and the
ADEA, see Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985);
Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983). Allegations of har-
assment also are common to constructive discharge cases under the NLRA, see
Maywood, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 979, 991-92 (1980); Galax Apparel Corp., 247 N.LR.B.
159, 167-68 (1980), and the ADEA, see Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 786 F.2d 1537,
1538-39 (l1th Cir. 1986); Pierce v. Green Giant Co., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1683, 1686 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Retaliation for engaging in protected activity is also a common factual situation. In
NLRA situations, employers seek to rid themselves of employees engaged in protected
activity, such as supporting union organizational drives. See eg., Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 886-87 (1984) (employer reported undocumented aliens to Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service in retaliation for their union activity after the employ-
ees voted for union representation); Kaynard v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047,
1053-54 (2d Cir. 1980) (reasonable cause to believe that the employee's union activity, not
the quality of her work, motivated the employer's discriminatory job assignment); J.P.
Steven[s] & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972) (the employer's attitude
became hostile after it learned of the employee's support of the union). In Houghton v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), a
constructive discharge case brought under the ADEA, the plaintiff maintained through-
out the period of his removal from flight status that the employer's actions violated the
ADEA. See id. at 563. The court held that the plaintiff did not resign, but was dis-
charged in retaliation for his "insistence upon his statutory rights under the Act." Id. at
564; see also Powell v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 788 F.2d 279, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1986) (plain-
tiff claims employer terminated him in retaliation for filing an ADEA complaint with the
EEOC and commencing suit). In ADEA situations, employers seek to compel the resig-
nation or retirement of employees within the protected age group, for instance, to develop
a younger image for the company. See Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1525,
1527-28 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (new hospital administrator "expressed surprise at the longevity
of" hospital staff, noted "that he wanted to attract younger" medical personnel and
"thought the hospital needed 'new blood' "); see also Downey v. Southern Natural Gas
Co., 649 F.2d 302, 303 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (employee was told that employer
might discharge him because it did not want to employ him through his mandatory re-
tirement age); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1981)
(employee claims that employer was motivated improperly by his age in coercing his
early retirement, alleging that employer's vice president wanted to replace older execu-
tives with younger ones).
A further connection to the NLRA is based on the frequency with which cases inter-
preting it are used for support in ADEA constructive discharge cases. See Bristow v.
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an employer.., by discrimination... to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization." 83 Courts 4 and the National Labor
Relations Board [NLRB]85 hold employers liable for constructive dis-
charge under this section. The NLRB has used the doctrine of construc-
tive discharge since 1936, without referring to it as such, 6 and first used
Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting J.P. Steven[s] & Co. v.
NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Sutton v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing same); Jacobson v.
American Home Prods., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 559, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (cit-
ing NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969) and NLRB v.
Hertz Corp., 449 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1971)). NLRA constructive discharge cases also arc
used as support in Title VII constructive discharge cases, see EEOC v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing J.P. Steven[s] & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d
490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing
Retail Store Employees Union Local 880 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1969));
Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 369 (6th Cir.) (citing NLRB v. Tennessee
Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1964)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977);
Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.) (citing J.P. Steven[s] &
Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972), NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419
F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969) and NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203 (6th Cir.
1964)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509
F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing five NLRA cases in support of its constructive
discharge general rule).
Finally, the policy objectives of private, nonlitigious dispute resolution that are rele-
vant to constructive discharge cases, see infra note 116 and accompanying text, are com-
mon to all three statutes. See, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[W]e believe that society and the policies underlying Title VII will be best
served if, wherever possible, unlawful discrimination is attacked within the context of
existing employment relationships."); see also infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text
concerning the duty to mitigate damages under the ADEA and Title VII. The National
Labor Relations Board will dismiss, without prejudice, an unfair labor practice charge
where the collective bargaining agreement has an arbitration clause and the employer is
willing to arbitrate. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839-43 (1971).
Although the NLRB, at one point, had refused to defer to arbitration where individual
rights were involved, see General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808-09 (1977), it recently
has re-established its policy of deferring to arbitration even when individual rights are
allegedly deprived. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559-60 (1984).
The NLRB's deferral doctrine has received support from the Supreme Court, see William
E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974), and other federal
courts, see Columbus Printing Pressman Union 252 (R.W. Page Corp.), 219 N.L.R.B.
268, 268 (1975), enforced, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976), for a list of opinions approving
the Collyer deferral doctrine. The filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, with resultant efforts to resolve disputes in a nonlitigious manner
through conciliation, is provided for under both Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1982), and the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), (d) (1982). The intent standard encour-
ages this objective. See infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
84. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984); NLRB v. S.E. Nich-
ols of Ohio, Inc., 704 F.2d 921, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
914 (1983); Kaynard v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. See Coating Prods., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1278 (1980), enforced, 648 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1981); Maywood, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 979, 991-92 (1980); Galax Apparel Corp.,
247 N.L.R.B. 159, 167-68 (1980).
86. See Lieb, Constructive Discharge Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Re-
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the term "constructive discharge" in 1938.7
In constructive discharge cases, the NLRB requires proof that the em-
ployer intended to compel the employee to resign.8" In Crystal Princeton
Refining Co.,s9 the NLRB stated that two elements must be proved in
constructive discharge cases.90 First, the employer must have imposed a
burden on the employee that causes, and was intended to cause, a change
in his working environment that sufficiently is unpleasant to compel his
resignation.91 Second, the employer must have imposed the burdens be-
cause of the employee's protected activity.92
Many courts have spoken on the proper standard to be used in con-
structive discharge cases under the NLRA.93 Regardless of their posi-
tion regarding the proper standard under the ADEA and Title VII,9
lations Act: A Study in Undue Concern Over Motives, 7 Indus. Rel. L.J. 143, 146 (1985)
(citing Canvas Glove Mfg. Works, I N.L.R.B. 519 (1936)).
87. See iL at 147 (citing Sterling Corset Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938)).
88. See Kogy's, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 202, 202 (1984); Crystal Princeton Refining Co.,
222 N.L.R.B. 1068, 1069 (1976); see also Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251,
1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing J.P. Steven[s] & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir.
1972), for the proposition that the Fourth Circuit "decisions require proof of the em-
ployer's specific intent to force an employee to leave"), cer. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461
(1986); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing
J.P. Steven[s] & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972), in support of its requirement
that the plaintiff establish intent to compel resignation), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
Lieb, supra note 86, at 156.
89. 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976).
90. See id. at 1069.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See e.g., NLRB v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1981) (employer
assigned employee to standby duty knowing that he would be unavailable to perform it
and would resign); Electric Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 958, 964-66 (5th Cir. 1981)
(no constructive discharge where employer urged employee to remain employed);
Kaynard v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (employer
harassed employee to induce her resignation); Cartwright Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 600
F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Such a forced resignation is a violation of section 8(a)(3)
when it has been induced to discourage union activity or membership."); J.P. Steven[s] &
Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972) (court enforced NLRB order where
NLRB accepted the Trial Examiner's finding that employee's "production rate 'was set at
an artificially low level' for the purpose 'of causing [her] to resign' "); NLRB v. Holly Bra
of California, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969) ("causing working conditions to
become intolerable as a means of terminating employment is forbidden conduct") (cita-
tion omitted); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1964)
(scheme to compel employee to resign); Steel Indus. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 173, 179 (7th
Cir. 1963) (no constructive discharge where there is no scheme "to get rid of" the
employee).
94. Several of the courts of appeals decisions cited supra note 93 were issued by courts
that currently use, or used at the time of those decisions, the intent standard in ADEA
and Title VII constructive discharge cases. See Cartvright Hardware, 600 F.2d at 270
(Tenth Circuit); J.P. Steven[s], 461 F.2d at 494 (Fourth Circuit); Tennessee Packers, 339
F.2d at 204-05 (Sixth Circuit). Without explaining the inconsistency in their positions,
the other courts currently use the objective standard in ADEA and Title VII constructive
discharge cases. See Cable Vision, 660 F.2d at 7-8 (First Circuit); Electric Mach., 653
F.2d at 964-65 (Fifth Circuit); Palby Lingerie, 625 F.2d at 1052-53 (Second Circuit);
Holly Bra, 405 F.2d at 872 (Ninth Circuit). The standard used by the Seventh Circuit
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these courts hold that an intent to compel resignation must be established
in constructive discharge cases under the NLRA.9 '
In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,96 the Supreme Court recognized the valid-
ity of the constructive discharge doctrine in the NLRA context.9"
Although the Court's enunciation of its standard was less than clear,9"
the Court apparently applied an intent to compel resignation require-
ment in its analysis, based on its citation of NLRA intent-standard cases
decided by lower courts99 and its analysis of the employer's state of
Court of Appeals currently is uncertain. See Steel Indus., 325 F.2d at 179 and supra note
49 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
96. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
97. See id. at 894. In Sure-Tan, an employer filed objections to the conduct of an
NLRB representation election based on the fact that six of the seven eligible voters were
undocumented aliens. See id. at 886-87. When the objections were overruled, the em-
ployer requested that the Immigration and Naturalization Service investigate the status
of a number of its employees. See id. at 887. As a result of the investigation, five of the
employees left the company to avoid deportation. See id. The Court affirmed the
NLRB's determination that the employer had constructively discharged the employees.
See id. at 894-98.
98. In reaching its holding in Sure-Tan, the Court did not announce a constructive
discharge standard that would indicate directly whether an intent to compel resignation
must be shown. The Court noted that
[t]he Board, with the approval of lower courts, has long held that an employer
violates [§ 8(a)(3)] not only when, for the purpose of discouraging union activ-
ity, it directly dismisses an employee, but also when it purposefully creates
working conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option but to re-
sign-a so-called 'constructive discharge.'
Id. at 894.
99. In support of its description of the NLRB constructive discharge standard, the
Court cited five cases that, on the whole, indicate that intent to compel resignation must
be established. See id. Three of these five cases directly support the requirement of estab-
lishing intent to compel resignation. See Cartwright Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d
268, 270 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Such a forced resignation is a violation of section 8(a)(3)
when it has been induced to discourage union activity or membership."); J.P. Steven[s] &
Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972) (court enforced NLRB order where
NLRB accepted the Trial Examiner's finding that employee's "production rate 'was set at
an artificially low level' for the purpose 'of causing [her] to resign' "); NLRB v. Holly Bra
of California, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969) (court enforced NLRB's order,
stating that "[a]n employer cannot do constructively what the act prohibits his doing
directly, and causing working conditions to become intolerable as a means of terminating
employment is forbidden conduct") (citation omitted).
The other cases cited in Sure-Tan lacked clear indication of whether proof of intent to
compel resignation is required. In NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th
Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit found a constructive discharge, see id. at 359, citing NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) in support of its finding that the em-
ployer's conduct, refusing to pay vacation benefits to strikers while paying them to non-
strikers, was inherently destructive of important employee rights. See id. at 30.
Accordingly, proof of anti-union motive was not required. See Haberman Constr. Co.,
641 F.2d at 360. In the final cited case, In re Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 10 (1937), the
NLRB did not state its standard explicitly when it found that the employer violated
section 8(a)(3) by conditioning continued employment upon employees' abandonment of
their strike. See id. at 17. The NLRB simply held that the employer's action was
"equivalent to discharging [its employees] outright for union activities." Id.
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mind."° Sure-Tan indicates that the intent to compel resignation is a
requirement in NLRA cases. Thus, as the constructive discharge doc-
trine used in ADEA cases originated in the NLRA context,101 and the
same interests favoring use of the intent standard exist in both statutes, °2
the intent standard should be used in ADEA constructive discharge
cases. 1
0 3
B. The Employer Intent Standard in Disparate Treatment Cases
Disparate treatment in an employment discrimination case exists when
"[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.""°4 Proof of
unlawful intent, either direct or indirect, is critical in disparate treatment
cases.105 Because most discriminatory discharge10 6 and constructive dis-
100. It is clear from the facts of Sure-Tan that the employer intended to compel the
termination of the employees. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 895. By requesting the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to investigate its undocumented alien employees, the em-
ployer must have known that any investigation would result in either the deportation or
departure of the employees. See id.
101. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
102. These interests include the facilitation of employer-employee relationships and
industrial peace, the elimination of discrimination against individuals and the private,
nonlitigious resolution of disputes. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
103. Two district courts have rejected the argument that the intent to compel resigna-
tion element required in NLRA constructive discharge cases supports the application of
the intent standard in ADEA and Title VII cases. In Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1984), an ADEA constructive discharge case, the
court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court's holding in Sure-Tan compels adop-
tion of the intent standard. See id. at 1101 n.3. In so doing, the court noted that subjec-
tive intent on the employer's part is a necessary element for a violation of NLRA section
8(a)(3). See i. In Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984), a Title VII
constructive discharge case, the district court rejected the contention that the Seventh
Circuit's use of the intent to influence union membership as an element in Jack Thomp-
son Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 1982), compels the use or the
intent standard in Title VII cases. See Bailey, 583 F. Supp. at 929.
In both cases, the court focused on the wrong intent element. To establish constructive
discharge under the NLRA, both the intent to encourage or discourage union activity
and the intent to compel resignation must be established. See supra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text. In both Bernstein and Bailey, the court focused on the element of
intent to encourage or discourage union activity, an element not required under the
ADEA or Title VII. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. It is the other intent
element applied in NLRA constructive discharge cases, intent to compel resignation,
which is just as important in ADEA and Title VII constructive discharge cases as it is in
NLRA constructive discharge cases, that supports use of the intent standard in ADEA
and Title VII constructive discharge cases.
104. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977).
Disparate treatment should be distinguished from disparate impact, which involves "em-
ployment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity." Id at 336 n.15.
105. According to the Supreme Court, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
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charge10 7 cases are brought under a disparate treatment theory, proof of
intent to compel resignation should be required in connection with find-
ings of constructive discharge. Indeed, failure to require proof of intent
in constructive discharge cases runs counter to the disparate treatment
doctrine.
Compared to the objective standard, the employer intent standard
more closely approximates the essence of the disparate treatment theory:
that some employees are treated "less favorably" than others. ° 8 The
constructive discharge plaintiff is protected only from unreasonably
harsh conditions that are "in excess of those faced by his co-workers."' 0 9
Hence, for the constructive discharge plaintiff to succeed under the intent
standard, he must establish that the employer treated him less favorably
than other employees."' No such showing is required under the objec-
ment." Id. at 335 n.15. In contrast, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive... is not required
under a disparate-impact theory." Id. at 336 n. 15.
For a discussion of the three stage order of proof used in disparate treatment cases, see
supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. This three stage order of proof reflects the
difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of an employer's motive. See Massarsky v. General
Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 117-18 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
Initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although the plaintiff's discharge is an element of
the prima facie case in discharge cases, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, the
plaintiff's constructive discharge is an element of the prima facie case in constructive
discharge claims. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. An actual discharge, of
course, is an intentional act. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. A constructive
discharge subjects the employer to the same liability as if it actually had discharged the
employee. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the burden on the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case should not be lightened in constructive discharge
cases by allowing him to substitute his resignation, not compelled by the employer, for an
intentional discharge.
The significance of the employer's intent to this three stage order of proof is evident.
In stage two, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In stage
three, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason was
pretextual. See id. at 804. In Cebula v. General Elec. Co., 614 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Ill.
1985), an ADEA discharge case, the court noted that "pretext is demonstrated by evi-
dence showing that [the employer] was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason
or that its justification is not credible." Id. at 263.
106. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 594. Similarly, almost all ADEA cases
are disparate treatment cases. See id. at 497.
107. See, e.g., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1986) (court
applies McDonnell Douglas order of proof); Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 F.
Supp. 434, 439-40 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (court applies a modified version of the McDonnell
Douglas order of proof to determine discriminatory motive); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518
F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (D.N.D. 1981) (court applies McDonnell Douglas order of proof).
But see Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1981) (allegations of
both disparate impact and disparate treatment).
108. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
109. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1461 (1986).
110. See id.; Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981). In this
case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the plaintiff did not satisfy the requisite intent element. See id. The court noted that all
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five standard.11'
By failing to consider whether the employer intended to compel the
employee's resignation, courts applying the objective standard may find
an employer liable for constructive discharge without a finding that the
plaintiff was treated differently than other employees. By so doing, these
courts contradict the essence of the disparate treatment theory.
C. The Intent Standard Encourages the Employee
to Remain Employed
Intent-standard courts consider whether the employer encouraged the
employee to remain on the job" 2 or urged him to resign, 113 an important
element in determining whether the employer compelled the resigna-
employees were treated identically, see id, rebutting any inference that the employer in-
tended to force the employee to resign. See id The court reasoned that the employer did
not wish to compel all of its employees to resign. See id.; see also Bristow v. Daily Press,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Johnson for the proposition that when
"all employees are treated identically, no particular employee can claim that difficult
working conditions signify the employer's intent to force that individual to resign"), cerL
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986). Accordingly, the holding in Johnson is consistent with
the disparate treatment requirement that the employer treat the employee less favorably
than other employees. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977); Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 179 (10th Cir.
1986).
111. Both the Bristow and Johnson courts found the issue of identical versus disparate
treatment of the constructive discharge plaintiff to be relevant to the issue of intent to
compel resignation. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,
1256 (8th Cir. 1981). Objective-standard courts do not require that plaintiffs establish
that the employer intended to compel their resignation. See supra note 52 and accompa-
nying text. They require the plaintiff to establish only that the working conditions were
objectively intolerable. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Presumably, under the
objective standard, an employee who resigns based on working conditions that were ob-
jectively intolerable for all employees could prevail on a constructive discharge claim
without establishing that he was treated differently than other employees.
112. See e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting
that plaintiff was urged to remain with employer), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986);
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983) (evidence that em-
ployee's supervisor urged her not to quit contradicts claim that employer sought to force
the employee to quit), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank,
467 U.S. 867 (1984); Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 174 (10th Cir. 1982)
(evidence of constructive discharge weak where employer lied to employee concerning his
pay in an effort to keep him on); see also Doscherholmen v. Walters, 575 F. Supp. 1552,
1553 (D. Minn.) (any inference of age discrimination is negated by defendant's alleged
counseling of plaintiff against retirement), aff'd without opinion, 754 F.2d 377 (1984).
One intent-standard court also has considered evidence that the employer made prompt
efforts to secure the plaintiff's return to work, after her resignation, as running counter to
the claim that the employer intended to compel her resignation. See Smith v. Acme
Spinning Co., 40 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104, 1109 (W.D.N.C. 1986); see also
Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 178 (10th Cir. 1986) (reversing directed
verdict for employer that did not encourage employee to remain).
113. See Wells v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
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tion." 4 An employer that encourages the employee to remain is less
likely to be held to have constructively discharged the plaintiff under the
intent standard.115 The statutory policy of resolving workplace disputes
within the context of existing employment relationships" 6 thus is pre-
served under the intent standard. Employees decrease their chances of
finding comparable work by resigning from their jobs." 7 This difficulty
in finding re-employment is acute particularly for older workers." 8
Therefore, the intent standard is preferable because it encourages em-
ployers and employees to maintain their employment relationship and
discourages resignation by making constructive discharge more difficult
to establish.
When an employee resigns, he takes away the employer's opportunity
to use effective methods to resolve problematic situations." 9 Employers
114. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text; see also Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d
1168, 1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (while noting that "the employer's subjective intent is
irrelevant," the court recognizes the connection between the employer's intent and cn-
couragement of the employee to remain).
115. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
116. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342 (10th Cir. 1986); Nolan v. Cleland,
686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. According to a popular job search guide
[i]f you have a choice, begin this [job search] homework while you are still
gainfully, and somewhat happily, employed. If you're employed, somebody
wants you-and values you enough to say so, in the coin of the realm. Ifyou're
unemployed, there is just the breath of suspicion that perhaps no one wants you.
And faced with this suspicion, many employers will choose to make no decision
about you (i.e., not hire you) rather than take a gamble.
R. Bolles, What Color is Your Parachute? 70-71 (1983) (emphasis in original).
118. In its ADEA statement of findings and purpose, Congress noted that "older
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and espe-
cially to regain employment when displaced from jobs." Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(a)(1), 81 Stat. 602, 602 (1967) (codified as 29
U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (1982)). The problems faced by older workers in finding suitable em-
ployment have been noted in other sources. According to one commentator, "once un-
employed, older workers usually remain without work for longer periods than other age
groups." R. Butler, Right to Work, Why Survive?-Being Old in America (1975), re-
printed in A. Smith, Employment Discrimination Law 78 (1978). In addition, "[o]lder
persons often become understandably discouraged in seeking jobs." Id. According to a
study conducted by the federal government
[o]nce an older worker loses his job, prospects for re-employment are dimmer
than for younger workers. Older workers still face discrimination in hiring. In
addition, their lower average level of educational attainment, and in some cases
obsolescence of skills, make it more difficult for them to compete with younger
workers. Many of those who do become re-employed find it necessary to accept
a lower wage than they received on their previous job. The difficulty of learning
new skills or of relocating in a new community add to the problem of re-
employment.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor Bulletin 1721, The Employment
Problems of Older Workers (1971), reprinted in A. Smith, Employment Discrimination
Law 80 (1978).
119. Unlawful discrimination is best "attacked within the context of existing employ-
ment relationships." Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
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should be encouraged to use such methods.120 Moreover, employees
should be discouraged from resigning when doing so deprives the em-
ployer of the opportunity to limit its liability by resolving the problems
leading to the employee's resignation. 2 ' Because a constructive dis-
charge finding subjects an employer to the same liability as if it actually
had discharged the employee,122 the court should allow the employer to
establish that it never intended to terminate the employment relation-
ship. One avenue available to the employer to do so under the intent
standard is to encourage the employee to remain, and thereby minimize
the chances that the employee will prevail on a constructive discharge
claim. 23 Conversely, by not urging the employee to remain, the em-
ployer increases the employee's opportunity to establish intent to compel
resignation. 2
4
Most courts using an objective standard do not consider evidence con-
cerning the employer's encouragement of the employee to remain or to
resign. Those objective-standard courts that do consider evidence of en-
couragement, 25 however, do so only to determine whether working con-
ditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel
compelled to resign. 26 While encouragement of the employee to remain
or resign negates or establishes directly the intent to compel resignation,
such evidence does not negate or establish directly the existence of intol-
There are a number of effective dispute resolution techniques that employers can use to
resolve disputes and eliminate employment discrimination without severing the employ-
ment relationship. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 605-08. When an employer
discharges an employee, the employer eliminates the possibility of resolving the underly-
ing problem within the existing employment relationship. When an employee resigns
before allowing adequate opportunity for internal dispute resolution, it is he who elimi-
nates the possibility of resolving the underlying problem within the existing employment
relationship. However, the employer is subjected to the same liability for resignations
deemed to be constructive discharges as if the employer had directly discharged the em-
ployee. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
125. See Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1986) (employee
encouraged to retire); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1983)
(employee urged to remain); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644
F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (employee was urged to remain); Anderson
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1483-85 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (employees
urged to retire under early retirement plan); Scott v. Oce Indus., 536 F. Supp. 141, 146
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (employee encouraged to quit); see also Downey v. Southern Natural Gas
Co., 649 F.2d 302, 303, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (employee told he might be
discharged before his mandatory retirement age); Choosing a Standard, supra note 9, at
607.
126. See Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 207.08 (5th Cir. 1986); Pena v.
Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1983); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Sep-
arate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981); Anderson v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1484-85 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see also Downey v.
Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (employee told
he might be discharged).
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erable working conditions. 2 ' Therefore, it is not certain that objective-
standard courts will consider evidence of encouragement when such evi-
dence does not directly implicate the intolerable working conditions ele-
ment applied by these courts. 28  Because of this uncertainty, the
objective standard provides less incentive for the employer to institute
positive action than is provided under the intent standard.
29
Arguments against considering evidence of encouragement fail under
close scrutiny. One argument is that employers will use false, insincere
persuasion to urge employees to remain on the job in order to avoid lia-
bility for constructive discharge. False persuasion, however, will be con-
sidered by the fact finder as a question of fact within the totality of the
circumstances. 130  Further, under the intent standard, the employer is
held to intend the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its actions.13'
Therefore, employers may not engage in conduct clearly indicative of the
intent to compel resignation and avoid liability by falsely encouraging the
employee to remain employed.
A second argument has been raised that employers should not be able
to minimize their liability for constructive discharge by encouraging em-
ployees to remain in a discriminatory work environment.132 A potential
constructive discharge plaintiff, however, can remain employed and
make efforts to resolve the discriminatory conditions, using litigation
only as a last resort. 133 This result supports the nonlitigious dispute reso-
127. Urging an employee to remain employed directly negates the existence of an in-
tent to compel resignation. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Similarly, failure
to encourage an employee considering resignation to remain, or urging an employee to
resign, is direct evidence of an intent to compel resignation. See supra notes 112-13. The
objectively determined intolerable working conditions element includes many diverse sit-
uations, such as unequal pay, see, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th
Cir. 1980), discriminatory job assignment, see, e.g., Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co.,
661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), and deprivation of career opportunities, see, e.g.,
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the direct relation-
ship that exists between encouragement to remain or resign and intent to compel resigna-
tion does not exist between encouragement to remain or resign and intolerable working
conditions.
128. For instance, in Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 751 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1984),
the employee was urged to remain with the employer. Id. at 55. However, the court did
not refer to this fact in affirming the district court's judgment for the plaintiff on her
constructive discharge claim. Id. at 55-56.
129. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
130. See Henry v. Lennox Indus., 768 F.2d 746, 751-52 (6th Cir. 1985); Easter v. Jeep
Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 1984).
131. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
132. A commentator who supports the objective standard contends that an employer
who blatantly discriminates, but nonetheless wishes to retain the services of the employee,
should be liable for constructive discharge. See Choosing a Standard, supra note 9, at
613. According to this argument, such an employer would be liable for constructive
discharge under the objective standard, but not under the intent standard. See id.
133. The employee can complain to appropriate employer officials or file a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text, to resolve the underlying discrimination.
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lution objective of the ADEA and Title VII. 34 Further, this position is
consistent with the ability of an employer to toll the continued accrual of
back pay liability by making an acceptable offer of employment or rein-
statement to the discrimination victim.' 35
D. Offers of Reinstatement, Back Pay and Constructive Discharge
Employer offers of reinstatement and constructive discharge have an
analogous effect on back pay liability. The employer's intent is consid-
ered in the case of offers of reinstatement. Therefore, it should be consid-
ered in cases of constructive discharge.
The requirement that employees mitigate their damages is statutory
under Title VII, 36 and is recognized under the ADEA.'37 Consistent
with the employee's duty of mitigation, 38 the Supreme Court held in
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC that employers may toll continued accrual of
post-discharge back pay by offering reinstatement to their former em-
134. See supra note 82 accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
136. Courts may award back pay under Title VII. According to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1982), "[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practic ... the court may... order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay." However, Title VII
plaintiffs have a statutory duty to mitigate their damages. "Interim earnings or amounts
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Id.
Courts have enforced this statutory duty of mitigation. See, e.g., Miller v. Marsh, 766
F.2d 490, 492 (11th Cir. 1985); Figgs v. Quick Fill Corp., 766 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir.
1985); Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
This Title VII duty of mitigation has two desireable economic goals: the prevention of
double recovery (both back pay and income from employment that the employee would
not otherwise have) and the discouragement of "unjustified [plaintiff) idleness." See
Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
137. The ADEA does not contain any express provision directly corresponding to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See Eglit, supra note 48, § 18.12, at 18.47 n.3. However, courts
consistently apply the rule that income, earned by ADEA plaintiffs prevailing in dis-
charge or refusal-to-hire cases that could not have been earned but for the discharge or
failure to hire, will be deducted from the plaintiffs' back pay awards. Id. at 18-46.
Although not all courts have addressed the issue of the plaintiff's obligation to mitigate
damages, those that have uniformly hold that the ADEA plaintiff has a duty to mitigate
damages under the ADEA. Ia at 18-46, 47; see, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic
Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's acceptance or rejection of
offer of reinstatement relevant to mitigation of damages); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639
F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980) ("wrongfully discharged claimants have an obligation to
use reasonable efforts to mitigate" damages); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433
F. Supp. 655, 662 (W.D. Va. 1977) (ADEA plaintiffs required to mitigate damages); see
also Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 523 (in order to obtain back pay, ADEA plain-
tiffs must make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages).
138. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. This duty of mitigation by seek-
ing comparable work through reasonable diligence includes the duty to mitigate with the
defendant employer. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543,
1551 (11th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 638
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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ployees, 3 9 thereby allowing them to obtain interim earnings. 140 To de-
termine whether an offer of reinstatement tolls back pay liability, courts
consider whether the employee was reasonable in rejecting the offer. 14 1
139. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982). Once an employer makes
an acceptable offer of reinstatement to an employee, and that offer is unreasonably re-
jected, the continued accrual of back pay is tolled. See id. In Ford Motor Co., the
Supreme Court held that, under Title VII, the accrual of back pay was tolled by the
refusal of plaintiffs, who were unlawfully denied employment, to accept the employer's
unconditional offer of employment, without retroactive seniority, in the job sought. See
id. at 241. Acceptance of such an unconditional offer satisfies the plaintiffs' statutory
duty to minimize damages while preserving their right to be made whole for pre-accept-
ance damages. See id. at 235.
Although Ford Motor Co. involves unlawful failure to hire, not unlawful discharge, the
case has been cited by courts addressing the mitigation duty of discharged employees, see,
e.g., Figgs v. Quick Fill Corp., 766 F.2d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1985), and employees who
have resigned, see, e.g., Miller v. Marsh, 766 F.2d 490, 492 (11th Cir. 1985).
Although Ford Motor Co. is a Title VII case, to the extent that the courts recognize an
ADEA plaintiff's duty to mitigate, see supra note 137 and accompanying text, the princi-
ples discussed therein are relevant to cases brought under the ADEA. Ford Motor Co.
has been cited in a number of ADEA cases. See, e.g., Giandonato v. Sybron Corp., 804
F.2d 120, 123-25 (10th Cir. 1986) (ADEA constructive discharge case; by refusing his
employer's offer of reinstatement employee did not comply with Ford Motor Co. 's man-
date); Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (ADEA
constructive discharge case; Ford Motor Co. discussed in connection with reasonableness
of plaintiff's rejection of employer's offer of reinstatement); Cowen v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (the Ford Motor Co. "rationale applies
equally to ADEA cases"); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 144, 149 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (citing Ford Motor Co. as supporting propositions, first, that a secondary goal of the
ADEA is to compensate victims of age discrimination and, second, that interim earnings
must be deducted from back pay award where ADEA plaintiff accepts a non-comparable
job).
The plaintiff who accepts an offer of reinstatement retains the right to receive a back
pay award for the period preceding the effective date of the offer. See Ford Motor Co.,
458 U.S. at 238. Plaintiff's failure to accept the defendant's offer of reinstatement does
not eliminate his entire cause of action retroactively. See Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck
Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982) (The employee "retains a right for damages
accruing from the time of termination until the expiration of the offer of reinstatement.").
140. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
141. In order to determine the effect of offers of reinstatement on defendant's back pay
liability, "court[s] must consider the circumstances under which the offer was made or
rejected, including the terms of the offer and the reasons for refusal." Claiborne v. Illi-
nois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); see
also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1550-51 (11 th Cir.
1984) (quoting Claiborne, 583 F.2d at 153); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc.,
703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1139
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981), quoting Claiborne, 583 F.2d at 153); Fiedler
v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting Claiborne,
583 F.2d at 153). For instance, the offer must be communicated adequately to plaintiff to
toll continued accrual of back pay liability. See Morvay v. Maghielse Tool and Die Co.,
708 F.2d 229, 232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1011 (1983). Although reasonable
conditions accompanying an offer of reinstatement will not invalidate tolling effect on
back pay, see id., unreasonable conditions will do so. See, e.g., Figgs v. Quick Fill Corp.,
766 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1985) (offer conditioned on plaintiff's agreement to compro-
mise his discrimination claims need not be accepted to meet mitigation duty); Morvay,
708 F.2d at 232 (noting in dicta that offer of reinstatement is insufficient to terminate
back pay liability where it is conditioned on plaintiff's abandonment of unfair labor prac-
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Courts also consider evidence indicative of the employer's intent, such as
whether the offer was made in good faith.'42
The legal effect of such offers of reinstatement on the damages award,
considered within the context of the employee's duty to mitigate, may be
analogized to the back pay consequences of an employee's resignation in
a constructive discharge case.' 43 In both offer of reinstatement cases' 44
tices claim or resignation of union steward); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697
F.2d 743, 757 (7th Cir.) (ADEA plaintiff was reasonable in refusing an offer of reinstate-
ment conditioned on him taking and passing a physical examination detrimental to his
discrimination claim), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983). Back pay liability is not tolled
where the plaintiff, an unsuccessful job applicant, refuses defendant's offer of a job not
substantially equivalent to the job originally sought. See Dickerson, 703 F.2d at 282-83
(distinguishing Ford Motor Co. where the job offered was not substantially similar to the
job sought).
A relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff's rejection of the reinstatement offer was
reasonable. See O'Donnell, 748 F.2d at 1550; Dickerson, 703 F.2d at 282; Orzel, 697 F.2d
at 757; Fiedler, 670 F.2d at 808; Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp.
630, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The trier of fact must "weigh the evidence to determine
whether a reasonable person would refuse the offer of reinstatement." Fiedler, 670 F.2d
at 808; see also O'Donnell, 748 F.2d at 1551 (quoting Fiedler, 670 F.2d at 808); Dickerson,
703 F.2d at 282.
The reasonableness of a plaintiff's decision to reject an offer of reinstatement may be
determined on an individualized basis. See Fiedler, 670 F.2d at 808; Claiborne, 583 F.2d
at 153. In contrast, the reasonableness of an employee's decision to resign is considered
on an objective basis. See supra notes 51 & 69 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the
standard of reasonableness used by objective-standard courts to determine intolerable
working conditions and, hence, liability for constructive discharge, may be distinguished
from the standard of reasonableness used in the mitigation context.
142. Although the relevant inquiry appears to be whether the plaintiff's rejection of
the reinstatement offer was reasonable under the circumstances, see supra note 141 and
accompanying text, courts also consider the intent of the employer in connection with the
offer of reinstatement. Courts consider whether an employer's offer of reinstatement is
bona fide, or made in good faith, see Figgs v. Quick Fill Corp., 766 F.2d 901, 904 (5th
Cir. 1985); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982);
Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1986); EEOC v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 786, 787 (W.D. Tenn.
1980); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 662-63 (W.D. Va. 1977);
see also Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1095 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (court
considers whether post-verdict offer of reinstatement was "reasonable and made in good
faith"). When employers place conditions on offers of reinstatement, courts may consider
the employer's purpose in applying such conditions. See Morvay v. Maghielse Tool and
Die Co., 708 F.2d 229, 232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1011 (1983). Finally, in
order to determine whether the plaintiff's rejection of an offer of reinstatement was rea-
sonable, courts consider evidence indicative of the employer's intent. For instance, in
Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983), an ADEA fail-
ure to hire case, the defendant offered the plaintiff a job that was not substantially
equivalent to the job she originally sought. See id. at 279, 282. The court, noting that
defendant knew plaintiff was not interested in the type of job offered, concluded that her
rejection of the offer was not necessarily unreasonable. Id. at 282. Accordingly, plain-
tiff's rejection did not toll the accrual of back pay damages automatically. See id.
143. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
144. The back pay issue in offer of reinstatement cases is whether the plaintiff is enti-
tled to back pay for the period subsequent to the defendant's offer to re-establish the
employment relationship or, in the case of a failure to hire, the defendant's offer to estab-
lish the employment relationship. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d
143, 153 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
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and constructive discharge cases,' 45 the issue is the employee's entitle-
ment to "back pay in spite of the employer's willingness to continue the
employment relationship."' 46 In both cases, discrimination is alleged,
but not yet proved. 147 The employee may return to, or remain in, the
employment relationship. The employer takes the actions necessary to
re-establish, or directly does not take the actions to terminate, the em-
ployment relationship."' Unless underlying discrimination is estab-
lished, 149 both constructive discharge and offers of reinstatement are
irrelevant for back pay purposes. Reinstatement offers and constructive
discharge determinations have a parallel impact on the employer's back
pay liability. Both acceptable offers of reinstatement' 50 and judgments
for the employer on constructive discharge claims' s cut off the em-
ployer's back pay liability.' 52 Similarly, when an offer of reinstatement is
unacceptable, 153 and when a constructive discharge is established, 5 4 the
employer's back pay liability continues to run. 55 In either case, the es-
sence of the issue is mitigation of damages.'
56
145. The back pay issue in constructive discharge cases is whether the plaintiff is enti-
tled to back pay for the period subsequent to his resignation. See, e.g., Satterwhite v.
Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509
F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
146. Constructive Discharge, supra note 9, at 575.
147. In constructive discharge cases, the plaintiff typically resigns, and then brings suit
against the employer for the underlying discrimination and constructive discharge. See,
e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1252 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1461 (1986); Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 304-05 (5th Cir.
Unit B June 1981); Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
In cases discussing the effect of offers of reinstatement upon the continued accrual of
back pay liability, the plaintiff's retainment of an unfettered right to pursue his discrimi-
nation claim is often at issue. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 234, 238
(1982); Figgs v. Quick Fill Corp., 766 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1985); Morvay v. Maghielse
Tool & Die Co., 708 F.2d 229, 232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1011 (1983); Orzel v.
City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 757 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992
(1983).
148. In constructive discharge situations, the employer does not take the direct action
of discharging the employee. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
149. The constructive discharge claim is dependent on the plaintiff's establishment of
underlying discrimination. See supra notes 21 & 23 and accompanying text. The issue of
the tolling of continued back pay liability, of course, is relevant only when the plaintiff
has established underlying discrimination, subjecting an employer to back pay liability.
150. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 29 and accompanying text concerning constructive discharge, and
supra note 139 and accompanying text concerning offers of reinstatement.
153. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text and supra notes 67-70 and accom-
panying text.
155. See supra note 29 and accompanying text concerning constructive discharge and
supra note 139 and accompanying text concerning offers of reinstatement.
156. For cases illustrating the connection between constructive discharge and mitiga-
tion of damages, see Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bourque
v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980); Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago,
562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977). For cases illustrating the connection between offers of
reinstatement and mitigation of damages, see Miller v. Marsh, 766 F.2d 490, 492 (11 th
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The approach of intent-standard courts toward constructive discharge
is consistent with the approach of courts toward offers of reinstatement.
In both situations, factors related to both the reasonableness of the em-
ployee's action and the intent of the employer are considered. 57 In addi-
tion, the policy interests of dispute resolution within existing
employment relationships, ' 58 employer self-correction of problems' 9
and avoidance of windfalls to plaintiffs" 6 are manifest in offer of rein-
statement situations' as well as constructive discharge.' 62 The consid-
eration of both employer intent and employee reasonableness supports
these objectives.
The objective standard is inconsistent with the ability of an employer
to toll accrual of post-discharge back pay liability through an offer of
reinstatement. 163 Independent of the standard used by courts to deter-
mine constructive discharge, courts consistently consider evidence of the
employer's good faith in re-establishing the employment relationship
through offers of reinstatement.'" Courts applying the objective stan-
Cir. 1985); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11 th Cir.
1984); Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
442 U.S. 934 (1979).
157. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text concerning constructive discharge
under the intent standard. In connection with the consideration of factors related to
employee reasonableness and employer intent, see Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers,
Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d
806, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1982); see also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748
F.2d 1543, 1550-51 (1lth Cir. 1984) (considering whether the employee's refusal of the
offer was reasonable as well as "the circumstances under which the offer was made or
rejected, including the terms of the offer and the reasons for refusal") (quoting Claiborne
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934
(1979)); Claiborne, 583 F.2d at 153 (same).
158. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982); Clark v. Marsh,
665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66
(5th Cir. 1980).
159. See, eg., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2411 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (existence of internal employee complaint procedure would be relevant to
sexual harassment victim's constructive termination claim); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,
458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974)) (in discussion of an offer of employment, Court notes that cooperation and volun-
tary compliance are the preferred means of ending employment discrimination).
160. See, eg., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 235 (1982) (plaintiffs made
more than whole when they receive back pay after rejecting unconditional offers of com-
parable employment); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)
(constructive discharge; employee not guaranteed work environment free from stress),
cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1461 (1986).
161. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Several of the decisions cited supra
note 142 were issued by courts in circuit courts of appeals which use the intent standard
in constructive discharge cases. See Morvay v. Maghielse Tool and Die Co., 708 F.2d
229 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1011 (1983); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers,
Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806
(8th Cir.1982); EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
786 (V.D. Tenn. 1980); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D.
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dard, however, do not consider the employer's intent to terminate the
employment relationship by compelling resignation. Under the objective
standard, an employer may be subjected to post-resignation back pay lia-
bility based on the reasonableness of the employee's actions alone,1 65 de-
spite the absence of intent to compel the resignation.' 66 Under either
standard, 167 an employer may toll back pay liability by expressing an
intent to re-establish the employment relationship. 16  Accordingly, the
employer should not be liable for additional damages for the termination
of that relationship when it did not intentionally compel the termination.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE INTENT STANDARD SPECIFIC
TO THE ADEA
Part II of this Note focused on the common considerations of the
ADEA and Title VII that suggest that the intent standard should be used
under both statutes. 69 The following sections indicate that this standard
is particularly applicable under the ADEA.
A. Voluntary and Involuntary Retirement under the ADEA
Employers commonly offer employees enhanced benefits for voluntary
early retirement. 7 The reasons for offering such incentives may include
the desire to achieve enhanced efficiency,' 7 ' save the additional costs as-
sociated with older workers172 and create advancement opportunities for
younger employees.17 3 Retirement plans 7 4 that require or permit invol-
Va. 1977). The other decisions cited supra note 142 were issued by courts of appeals
which use the objective standard in constructive discharge cases. See Figgs v. Quick Fill
Corp., 766 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1985); Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir.
Unit B Dec. 1981); Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
165. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 143 & 164 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part II.
170. "Early retirement is a common corporate practice utilized to prevent individual
hardship. It is a humane practice well accepted by both employers and employees, and is
purely voluntary." Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); see also 1 H. Eglit, Age Discrimination, § 16.39B,
at 1S-194 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter Eglit Supplement] ("It has become increasingly com-
mon for employers to offer incentives to employees to retire early.").
171. See Eglit Supplement, supra note 170, § 16.39B, at IS-194.
172. See Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1986); Coburn v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994
(1983); Eglit Supplement, supra note 170, § 16.39B, at IS-194.
173. See EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982); Anderson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1482 (N.D. Il. 1987); Eglit Supplement,
supra note 170, at § 16.39B, 1S-194; see also EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 343, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (voluntary early retirement plans "forestall layoffs of
younger workers").
174. A typical early retirement plan may include supplementary payments to employ-
ees, calculation of retirement benefits without actuarial adjustment for early retirement
and extra medical and life insurance coverage. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y,
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untary retirement within the protected age group violate the ADEA,'"
but voluntary, enhanced-benefit early retirement plans generally have
been approved by the courts.176 Early retirement plans that are labelled
voluntary, but in fact effectively force older workers to retire, violate the
ADEA.
177
Courts consider the intent of the employer as a factor in their analysis
of voluntary early retirement plans.17 1 Under section 4(f)(2) of the
40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1186, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987).
175. According to § 4(f)(2) of the ADEA, no pension plan "shall require or permit the
involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631 (a) of this title because of
the age of such individual." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982). See Allen v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 62 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting § 4(f)(2)).
176. See eg., Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1986) (additional
incentive for early retirement generally is no more repugnant to the ADEA than other
retirement plans); Patterson v. Independent School Dist. # 709, 742 F.2d 465, 468 (8th
Cir. 1984) ("a voluntary early retirement plan is afortiori permissible" and such a policy
"is entirely compatible with § 623(f)(2)") (emphasis in original); EEOC v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (voluntary plans "which provide
benefits to encourage early retirements ... are permitted"); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(f)
(1986) (not unlawful for plan to permit individuals to elect early retirement on a volun-
tary basis); Eglit Supplement, supra note 170, § 16.39B, at 1S-195 (generally courts ap-
prove early retirement plans).
177. See Eglit Supplement, supra note 170, § 16.39B, at IS-194-95; see also EEOC v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (ADEA prohibition of
mandatory retirement within the protected age group extends to forced retirement and
"unlawfully induced 'voluntary' retirements"); Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 519
(early retirement plans not unlawful if plan is truly voluntary; if pressure is used, liability
may result).
Where the only inducement for early retirement was the enhanced retirement package,
and the employer did not encourage the employee to accept the offier, there is no viola-
tion. See Henn v. National Geographic Soe'y, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1186,
1187 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987).
Courts distinguish between retirement plans or other employer actions that force an
employee to retire at a given age from those that merely permit him to do so. See. e.g.,
Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1986); Britt v. EI. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d 593, 594-95 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d
252, 261 (2d Cir. 1982). In rejecting an employer's § 4(f)(2) defense, a district court
noted that "the right to early retirement is one which the employee may elect with the
consent of the Company. The Company has only the right to preclude it, not force it."
EEOC v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1611, 1643 (E.D.N.C.
1982). The court indicated that had the plan authorized forced early retirement, it would
have constituted a subterfuge under the facts of that case. See id.
178. To determine whether the employer's actions were a "subterfuge to evade the
purposes of [the ADEA]," 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2), thereby invalidating the § 4(f)(2) de-
fense, see infra note 180 and accompanying text, courts must consider evidence regarding
the employer's motives. In EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1982), the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendant's
summary judgment motion, id. at 253, noting that
far from establishing as a matter of law that Home's action was not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of the Act, this 'reason' plainly indicates that it may very
well have been Home's intent to eliminate older workers in favor of younger
ones, a conclusion that would require the entry of judgment against Home.
Ia at 262 (emphasis in original).
The intent to induce voluntary early retirement, by itself, is not unlawful. See infra
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ADEA, 179 employers have a defense against charges of ADEA violations
if they "observe the terms of a bona fide ... employee benefit plan such
as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of [the ADEA]." 180 To determine whether the em-
ployer's actions were a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of" the
ADEA, courts consider evidence of the employer's motives. 181 For in-
stance, an intent to eliminate older workers in favor of younger workers
is unlawful. 18 The intent to induce employees to retire voluntarily early,
by itself, is not unlawful."8 3 Courts do not find violations when employ-
note 183. Further, an employer does not violate the ADEA when it intentionally compels
an employee to retire for reasons other than age. See Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
646 F.2d 407, 410 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (no violation where employer offered employee
enhanced retirement benefits because it was dissatisfied with his work). The employee
"must prove that [defendant's] motivation in desiring his termination was based on illicit
age criteria." Id.
179. As originally enacted, § 4(f)(2) stated that
[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer.., to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
[the ADEA], except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure
to hire any individual ....
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(f)(2), 81 Stat.
602, 603 (1967). The aim of this section was to promote the hiring of older workers by
relieving employers of the economic burden of providing the same benefits for older and
younger workers. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, H.R. Rep. No.
805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2213,
2217; see also Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 904 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 805), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
In United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), the Supreme Court held that,
under § 4(f)(2), involuntary retirement within the protected age group was permissible
pursuant to a plan adopted before the enactment of the ADEA. See id. at 203.
Congress responded to the McMann decision in 1978 by amending the ADEA to pro-
hibit involuntary retirement. See Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation,
631 F. Supp. 1198, 1205 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 802 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1986);
Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 518. In addition to raising the protected age limit to
seventy, Congress amended § 4(f)(2) to include the provision that "no such seniority
system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any
individual specified by section 12(a) [29 U.S.C. § 631 (a)] of this Act because of the age of
such individual." Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978).
Although the 1978 amendment generally prohibited age-based involuntary early retire-
ment within the age group protected by the ADEA, see Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
539 F. Supp. 57, 62 n. I (S.D.N.Y. 1981), exceptions are recognized. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
180. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
181. See, e.g., Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1986); EEOC v.
Home Ins. Co., 672 F. 2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982).
182. See id.; see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1485-
86 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (employer's summary judgment motion denied where it used separa-
tion plan, with disparate impact on older workers, in order to promote younger workers).
183. In Patterson v. Independent School Dist. # 709, 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984),
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a teachers' early retirement incentive
plan. Id. at 469. The court noted that "[t]he new plan, it was hoped, would furnish an
incentive for teachers to trigger or activate the general pension plan at an earlier age, by
holding out the 'carrot' of 'an early retirement incentive. . .' if eligible for normal retire-
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ees retire early to realize enhanced benefits, 84 even if the plans were
drafted with that objective in mind.' Coercion is necessary: when
"pressure, subtle or otherwise, is used to encourage 'voluntary' retire-
ment, liability may result."' 86
The requirement that an ADEA plaintiff establish that the retirement
plan in fact is coercive' 87 supports the proposition that, in ADEA con-
structive discharge cases, the plaintiff must establish the intent to coerce
his resignation. There is an established relationship between early retire-
ment plans and constructive discharge.188 Indeed, employees who retired
under allegedly voluntary retirement plans have brought claims under a
constructive discharge theory.' 89
To determine whether the employer violated the ADEA under early
retirement' 90 or constructive discharge' 9' theories, the principal issue is
whether the employee's retirement or resignation is based on the em-
ployee's own decision, or is attributable to the conduct of the employer.
It is only when the employer's actions are coercive that the ADEA is
violated. 19 2
Employer coercion of early retirement is similar to constructive dis-
charge by employers' intentional coercion of employees' resignations.
Courts using the objective standard in constructive discharge cases con-
sider only the nature of the working conditions, 93 which may be analo-
gized to consideration of the terms of the early retirement plan. To
ment at 55." Id. at 467-68; see also Britt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d
593, 595 (4th Cir. 1985) (severance pay offer designed exclusively to induce employees to
retire early held lawful).
184. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
186. EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (quot-
ing Schlei & Grossman, supra note 9, at 519).
187. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
188. For instance, constructive discharge is an element of the prima facie case to be
established by plaintiffs bringing ADEA challenges to their retirement under voluntary
retirement plans. See Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1484-85
(N.D. ]1l. 1987); Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 61, 62 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see also Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1186, 1187 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (plaintiff who accepted early retirement must prove some
adverse employment action, namely constructive discharge), aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987). The alleged coercion of voluntary retirement has been
analogized to constructive discharge. See Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retar-
dation, 631 F. Supp. 1198, 1205 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 802 F.2d 456 (6th Cir.
1986).
189. See, eg., Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir.
1982); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 408 (9th Cir. 1981); Henn v. Na-
tional Geographic Soc'y, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1186, 1186-87 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
aff'd, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1620 (7th Cir. 1987); Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Baxter and Farrell, supra note 9, at
357-58.
190. See supra notes 175 & 177 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 175 & 177 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
determine whether a voluntary retirement plan is coercive, however,
courts must look beyond the terms of the plan, 194 or by analogy, beyond
the actual working conditions, to determine whether the employer in fact
implemented the plan in a coercive manner.' 95 Similarly, courts using
the intent standard look beyond the actual working conditions, 96 into the
intent of the employer to coerce the employee's resignation. 197 This sup-
ports use of a strong intent requirement in the analogous situation of
constructive discharge under the ADEA. 198
B. Willfulness and Liquidated Damages under the ADEA
Damages available under the ADEA include injunctive relief,199 rein-
statement,2°° back pay,20 ' front pay202 and reasonable attorney's fees and
costs.2 03 In addition, a finding that the employer willfully violated the
Act results in an award of liquidated, or double, damages.204 The statu-
tory basis of these liquidated damages awards derives from the incorpo-
ration of the remedial provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 20 5 into
the ADEA.2 °6
194. Employer coercion of employees to retire early is required in order to prove a
violation. See supra notes 175 & 177 and accompanying text.
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
198. In determining whether an employee's decision to retire under the terms of an
early retirement plan may be attributed to the employer as a violation of the ADEA,
courts require coercion. See supra notes 175 & 177 and accompanying text. The em-
ployee's uncoerced decision, alone, is not sufficient to establish employer liability. See id.
Similarly, liability for an employee's resignation should not be placed on the employer
unless the employer intentionally compelled the resignation.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
200. Id.
201. Id. Awards of back pay include damages for lost wages, pension benefits, insur-
ance benefits, profit sharing benefits and accrued sick leave. See Schlei & Grossman,
supra note 9, at 522 & nn.215-19.
202. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551
(I th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). See generally
Front Pay Under ADEA, supra note 29.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
204. If a willful violation is established, the employer is liable for liquidated damages in
an amount equal to the unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. See
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In other words, the employer is liable for double damages. See Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
206. Amounts owed based on violations of the ADEA "shall be deemed to be unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation" under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 626(b). According to this section of the ADEA, "liquidated damages shall
be payable only in cases of willful violations." Id.
The Supreme Court has noted that "the rights created by the [Age Discrimination in
Employment] Act are to be 'enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and pro-
cedures' of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978)). However, the
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A determination that the employer's violation is willful has two conse-
quences: the availability of liquidated damages °7 and application of a
three year statute of limitations period20 8 instead of the standard two
year period.20 9 Only the former consequence is of relevance here.
The Supreme Court clarified the standard of willfulness for ADEA
liquidated damages purposes in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston.210
The Court held that the airline violated the ADEA by permitting those
disqualified from serving in a captain's capacity for reasons other than
age to transfer automatically to flight engineer positions, but not afford-
ing this privilege to those disqualified from captain positions because of
age.z"' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had applied a stan-
dard whereby an ADEA violation was " 'willful' if 'the employer either
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct
was prohibited by the ADEA.' ,"2 The Court held that this willfulness
standard was acceptable,213 but that the Second Circuit had misapplied
the standard in finding that the employer's violation was willful.21 4 The
Court stated that the employer "acted reasonably and in good faith in
attempting to determine whether their plan would violate the
ADEA." 215
By requiring proof of intent to compel resignation for constructive dis-
charge liability,216 intent-standard courts consider the employer's state of
mind. Objective-standard courts do not require evidence of the em-
ployer's state of mind to find constructive discharge.217 Although inten-
tional violations of the ADEA may not be equated with willful
Court noted that the remedial provisions of the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act
are not identical, stating that "§ 16(b) of the FLSA [29 U.S.C. § 216(b)], which makes
the award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly qualified in ADEA § 7(b) [29
U.S.C. § 626(b)] by a proviso that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to double damages
'only in cases of willful violations."' Id.
207. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1982), incorporating the provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255(a), 259 (1982); see EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632
F. Supp. 343, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Kneisley v. Hercules Inc., 577 F. Supp. 726, 736 (D.
Del. 1983). It is unclear whether the same willfulness standard applies to both statute of
limitations and liquidated damages issues. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111 (1985), the Supreme Court noted a split among the circuit courts of appeals
concerning this issue, but declined to resolve this dispute. See id at 128 n.21; see also
Westinghouse, 632 F. Supp. at 371.
209. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1982), incorporating the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255, 259 (1982).
210. 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985).
211. See id. at 124-25.
212. Id. at 128 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713
F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)).
213. See id. at 128-29.
214. See id. at 129.
215. Id.
216. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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violations,21 the employer's state of mind and good faith are considered
to be relevant to a determination of willfulness by both intent-standard
courts and objective-standard courts. 219 This willfulness determination
218. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 n.19 (1985); EEOC
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 371-72 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Real v. Continen-
tal Group, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434, 444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
219. Willfulness is an issue of fact. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 343, 372 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Slenkamp v. Borough of Brentwood, 603 F. Supp.
1298, 1302 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 475 F. Supp. 875, 883
(E.D. Mich. 1979). For purposes of determining liability for liquidated damages, the
burden of proof of willfulness is on the plaintiff. See Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696
F.2d 1176, 1184 (6th Cir. 1983); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979
(9th Cir. 1981); Westinghouse, 632 F. Supp. at 372 n.22.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, while an intentional violation may not be
equated with a willful violation, the employer's intent, and evidence indicative of that
intent, are relevant to a determination of willfulness. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 129 (1985).
Courts have recognized the close relationship between willfulness and the employer's
mental state and intent. See, e.g., Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir.
1986); Spear v. Dayton's, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267, 269 (D. Minn. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1984); Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539
F. Supp. 57, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For example, in Richland Shoe, a Fair Labor Standards
Act case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Thurston willfulness
standard. Richland Shoe, 799 F.2d at 83. The court noted the close relationship between
willfulness and intent, stating that "[a]lthough the meaning of willful is not fixed and
determinate, it is clear that willfulness is akin to intentionality. A willful act requires a
deliberate effort, more than mere negligence." Id. at 82; see also Wehr v. Burroughs
Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980) (willful violation established by discharge that
was voluntary, not accidental or inadvertent). Spear (Eighth Circuit) was decided in a
circuit court of appeals which uses the intent standard in constructive discharge cases,
while Brock (Third Circuit), Wehr (Third Circuit) and Allen (Second Circuit) were de-
cided in circuits which use the objective standard in constructive discharge cases.
The issue of the employer's knowledge of the legality of its actions is significant. See,
e.g., Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128-29; see also Richland Shoe, 799 F.2d at 83 (applying the
Thurston standard); Westinghouse, 632 F. Supp. at 372 (employer had the resources to
attempt compliance with the ADEA but resisted compliance).
The employer's good faith, an aspect of its state of mind, also is relevant to a determi-
nation of willfulness. The Supreme Court noted that Congress did not incorporate the
Portal-to-Portal Act good faith defense, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982), to a Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act liquidated damages award, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982), into the ADEA. Thur-
ston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22 (1985); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 n.8 (1978). Yet,
the Court believes that "the same concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) [29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)] of the ADEA." Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22. Thus, although
"good faith is not a defense to willfulness. . . . good faith is relevant to the issue of
willfulness." Westinghouse, 632 F. Supp. at 373 n.23 (citation omitted).
By analogy, the Wehr court's treatment of the discharge as a willful violation provides
support for use of the intent standard in ADEA constructive discharge cases. Courts
applying the intent standard require proof of intent to compel the employee's resignation
in order to establish employer liability for constructive discharge. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text. Courts applying the objective standard consider evidence of the em-
ployer's intent to compel resignation irrelevant to the issue of constructive discharge, see
supra note 52 and accompanying text, and to the additional liability resulting from the
determination of constructive discharge. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals uses the objective standard in constructive cases. See
Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). However, by holding the
employer's violation to be willful based on the fact that the unlawful discharge was volun-
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results in the employer's liability for additional damages resulting from
the underlying ADEA violation.2 2 ° When courts find constructive dis-
charge, they are in fact assessing additional damages, particularly post-
resignation back pay, for the underlying violation. 22  Therefore, courts
should be consistent and examine the employer's state of mind in deter-
mining the employer's liability for constructive discharge.
A hypothetical situation illustrates this concept. Assume a victim of
age discrimination resigned because of intolerable working conditions,
but the resignation was not compelled intentionally by the employer and
the violation was not wilful.222 The employer would be subject to liabil-
ity for the underlying discrimination,2 3 but apparently would not be
subject to liability for liquidated damages. 24 However, such a resigna-
tion could constitute a constructive discharge under the objective stan-
dard,225 resulting in liability to the employer for both damages for the
underlying discrimination 226 and additional damages for post-resignation
back pay.2 27 Consistent with the courts' application of the willfulness
standard,22 such a resignation would not be considered a constructive
discharge under the intent standard without evidence of improper intent
on the part of the employer.229 As with a violation of the ADEA that is
not found to be willful,230 the employer would be liable in damages for
the intolerable working conditions that, according to the plaintiff, re-
sulted in his resignation, 231 but not for any additional damages above and
beyond those damages.232 Therefore, consideration of the requirements
necessary to subject an employer to liability for liquidated damages lends
support for use of the analogous intent standard in ADEA constructive
discharge cases.
tary on the employer's part, the Wehr court explicitly used evidence to subject the em-
ployer to additional liability for a willful violation in a situation closely analogous to
constructive discharge, where it considers such evidence to be irrelevant.
220. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
224. Assuming that the employer here did not act in reckless disregard concerning the
legality of its actions, the employer's actions will not be considered willful under the
standard applied in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1985).
225. Under the objective standard, courts consider only the objective intolerability of
working conditions to determine constructive discharge. See supra notes 50-51 and ac-
companying text. The employer's intent is irrelevant. See supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text.
226. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
229. This is based on the requirement under the intent standard that the plaintiff estab-
lish that the defendant intended to compel his resignation. See supra note 70 and accom-
panying text.
230. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Two different standards of proof for constructive discharge cases
brought under the ADEA and Title VII currently are used by the federal
courts of appeal. The majority view requires only that the plaintiff estab-
lish that working conditions were so objectively intolerable that the em-
ployee had no choice but to resign. The minority view requires the
additional showing that the employer intended to compel the employee's
resignation.
The intent standard is more appropriate in ADEA cases for several
reasons inherent in both general principles of employment discrimination
law and factors specific to the ADEA. The interests favoring use of the
intent standard in NLRA cases, where the doctrine of constructive dis-
charge originated, also support the use of the intent standard in employ-
ment discrimination cases. Additionally, the intent standard is
consistent with the disparate treatment theory under which most actual
discharge and constructive discharge cases are brought. By considering
evidence of the employer's encouragement of the employee to resign or
remain employed, the intent standard supports employer efforts to en-
courage employees to remain. Further, consideration of the employer's
intent to compel resignation is consistent with the effect of employer of-
fers of reinstatement on back pay liability.
A number of arguments favoring use of the intent standard particu-
larly are appropriate in the context of ADEA constructive discharge
cases. The intent standard is consistent with the law concerning volun-
tary and involuntary retirement under the ADEA. Finally, consideration
of employer intent to compel resignation is consistent with the willfulness
standard used to determine liability for liquidated damages under the
ADEA. Courts should consider these arguments in determining the
proper, uniform standard to be applied in ADEA and Title VII construc-
tive discharge cases.
Ira M. Saxe
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